Case Study 1

## Codes

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Great Quotes |  | 0 | 0 |

## Codes\\Academic Interaction

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Academia |  | 2 | 9 |

## Codes\\Constructivism

Constructivism emphasizes the social meaning attached to behavior, and considers the convergence of socially constructed ideals as causal.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Constructivism |  | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Normative | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 3 | 62 |
| Domestic-International Interplay | National norms affect international politics (domestic/international interplay) | 2 | 12 |
| Logic of Appropriateness | Actors internalize roles and rules as scripts to which they conform…because they understand the behavior to be good, desirable, and appropriate (F&S p. 912) | 1 | 6 |
| Norm Entrepreneurs | Successful norm creation requires norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms (i.e., institutions) from which entrepreneurs act (F&S, 1998, p. 896) Often appears as “international engagement” in the 2010 NSS (“the active participation of the US in relationships beyond our borders…the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes”) p. 11 | 3 | 24 |
| Security, Norms | Security comes from actors defaulting to generally accepted norms of behavior. (Causal mechanism: norms) | 3 | 11 |
| Soft Power | Soft power advantage goes to states whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms. Soft power relies on attraction or persuasion born of an affinity for one’s culture, ideas, or values (J. S. Nye 1990); “credibility is enhanced by domestic and international performance” (J. Nye Joseph S. 2004, 82) Soft power increases in importance in the information age, but the ability to wield it is undermined by competing value propositions in the norm marketplace (Nye, 2014) | 2 | 9 |
| International Norms |  | 3 | 249 |
| Adopt | Adopt / adoption of norms | 0 | 0 |
| Agreement |  | 3 | 7 |
| Behavior | Desired behavior / standards of behavior | 2 | 5 |
| Belief | Believe / belief | 1 | 7 |
| Collective |  | 2 | 6 |
| Consensus |  | 3 | 6 |
| Culture |  | 1 | 13 |
| Identity |  | 1 | 7 |
| Ideology | Ideology / Ideas | 1 | 17 |
| Incentives | Incentive / Incentivizing | 2 | 18 |
| Institutionalization | Institutions / institutionalize | 0 | 0 |
| Like Minded |  | 3 | 9 |
| Moral |  | 1 | 5 |
| Multilateral | Multilateral / Multistakeholder | 2 | 4 |
| Norms |  | 3 | 27 |
| Partnerships\_Normative |  | 3 | 27 |
| Persuade | Persuade / persuasion | 1 | 4 |
| Principles |  | 3 | 9 |
| Regime |  | 1 | 1 |
| Relationships |  | 2 | 7 |
| Rules |  | 2 | 6 |
| Socialize | Socialization / Society | 0 | 0 |
| Soft Power |  | 1 | 12 |
| Standards | Standards of behavior | 2 | 18 |
| Subjective |  | 0 | 0 |
| Values |  | 2 | 33 |

## Codes\\Cyber

All mentions of cyber in non-cyber strategic documents, and nuanced cyber language that doesn’t “fit” in other IR coding categories.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Critical Infrastructure | Cyber threats to CI/KR | 1 | 3 |
| Cyber Capabilities |  | 1 | 1 |
| Cyber Security |  | 1 | 8 |
| Digital Infrastructure |  | 2 | 23 |

## Codes\\Cyber Persistence Theory

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cyber Persistence |  | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Persistence | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 2 | 3 |
| Attribution, Difficult | Attribution is difficult and cost of entry is low; secret capabilities are adaptive to anticipate vulnerabilities; signaling occurs after the fact. | 0 | 0 |
| Interconnected | Man-made, fluid, interconnected terrain creates a strategic environment of constant contact. | 2 | 3 |
| Operational Exploitation | Continuous operations and campaigns are exploitive (not coercive), using code to take advantage of others’ cyber vulnerabilities to gain strategic advantage. | 0 | 0 |
| Security, Operational Persistence | Security comes from operational persistence below the threshold of armed conflict, acting in anticipation of exploitable cyber vulnerabilities. (Causal mechanism: changes in conditions of security and insecurity) | 0 | 0 |
| Structural Characteristics | The structural characteristics of the cyber strategic environment rewards those who anticipate the exploitation of vulnerabilities, driving an imperative to persist in seeking the initiative. | 0 | 0 |
| Persistence |  | 2 | 22 |
| Agreed Competition |  | 0 | 0 |
| Compete | Compete / competition / competitive interaction | 0 | 0 |
| Constant Contact |  | 0 | 0 |
| Contest |  | 0 | 0 |
| Defend Forward |  | 0 | 0 |
| Dynamic |  | 0 | 0 |
| Exploitation | Exploitive / Exploit / exploitable cyber vulnerabilities | 0 | 0 |
| Fluid Boundaries | Fluid, malleable environment | 2 | 5 |
| Grappling |  | 0 | 0 |
| Grey Zone | Grey Zone Conflict / below threshold of armed conflict | 0 | 0 |
| Hunt Forward |  | 0 | 0 |
| Initiative |  | 0 | 0 |
| Interconnected |  | 2 | 15 |
| Man-made |  | 1 | 1 |
| Persistent Engagement | Persistent Engagement / Persist / Persistence | 0 | 0 |
| Resilience |  | 0 | 0 |
| Structure | Structural characteristics | 1 | 1 |

## Codes\\Liberalism

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberalism |  | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Liberalist | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 3 | 96 |
| Interdependence | Complex interdependence renders national economies more sensitive and vulnerable to events in other countries. The global nature of the Internet intensifies interdependence and demands cooperation. | 2 | 21 |
| International Cooperation | International cooperation is desirable and possible. Economic and Internet governance cooperation can drive politico-military cooperation. | 2 | 25 |
| Norms, Self-Interest | Norm conformance is driven by material self-interest; Actors construct and conform to norms because norms help them get what they want . | 2 | 7 |
| Rational, Share Power | States are primary (rational) actors, but they share power with non-state actors. | 2 | 21 |
| Security, Institutions | Security comes from leveraging institutions to foster cooperative relationships built on mutual trust. (Causal mechanism: cooperation/institutions) | 2 | 20 |
| World as it ought to be | Utopianism was a normative, optimistic ideology that produced moralistic, prescriptive theories of political behavior based on how the world ought to be (Carr 1939, 6). | 2 | 2 |
| NLI |  | 3 | 538 |
| Absolute Gains |  | 0 | 0 |
| Agreement |  | 2 | 5 |
| Alliance | Alliances: according to realists, in self-help systems alliances are formed to enhance member states' security against threats. Predict that they will be disbanded once the threat is passed, making them less enduring than political communities. Osgood called it a "latent war community". Alliances use balance of power theory; when one coalition is on the verge of victory, other states may join the weaker coalition in order to balance (Riker). Kegley and Raymond: normative standards reinforcing alliance co | 2 | 40 |
| Collaboration | With domestic and international partners | 3 | 39 |
| Collective | As in, collective security | 2 | 16 |
| Communication |  | 1 | 4 |
| Consent |  | 1 | 2 |
| Cooperation | Cooperation and coordination Utopian explanation is cooperation based upon shared universal values. This falls within cosmopolitan theory (JS Mill). Integration is the result of universal norms and morality. | 2 | 62 |
| Economic |  | 2 | 68 |
| Global |  | 2 | 45 |
| Institutions | o Neoliberals stress the role of institutions, broadly defined as shared expectation of behavior that deserve formal assent and agreement o Realists believe that institutions are instruments of statecraft o Liberals: institutions foster cooperation o Realists: Institutions are only established if they help advance the goals that the state is seeking | 2 | 46 |
| Integration | "process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states." (Ernest Haas) Integration is a process relying on internalization by the actors and arises as a result of support from within the unit being integrated, such as the EU. | 2 | 23 |
| Interdependence |  | 2 | 24 |
| International Order | The International Order is defined as the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations between the key players on the international stage. | 1 | 20 |
| Liberal |  | 0 | 0 |
| Like Minded |  | 2 | 3 |
| Multilateral | Multilateralism / Multistakeholder Cooperation among 3 or more actors based on generalized principles of conduct (Ruggie). | 2 | 18 |
| Mutual Interests |  | 2 | 17 |
| Organizations |  | 2 | 12 |
| Partnerships\_Cooperative |  | 2 | 64 |
| Rational | Rational actor / Reasonable | 0 | 0 |
| Regime |  | 2 | 4 |
| Relationships |  | 2 | 16 |
| Rules | Rules and regulations | 2 | 5 |
| Trust |  | 2 | 5 |

## Codes\\Policy Engineering Tasks

The seven policy engineering tasks that ground the theory-practice alignment/misalignment assessment methodology.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Policy Engineering Tasks | The application of knowledge, principles, and methods to the solution of specific public problems in a given political environment. Zelikow’s framework framework is comprised of seven distinct, iterative tasks that need not occur in chronological order. | 3 | 269 |
| Design |  | 0 | 0 |
| Implementation |  | 2 | 3 |
| Maintenance |  | 0 | 0 |
| National Interests |  | 1 | 15 |
| Objective |  | 1 | 40 |
| Review |  | 2 | 206 |
| Strategy |  | 1 | 5 |

## Codes\\Realism

Descriptive theories based on a “pessimistic” view of human nature and the world as it is. Hobbesian morality is equivalent to the “rightness” of the state, whose chief function is to prevent unabated self-interest from causing chaos and civil war.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Realism | Structurationist ontological theory in which states are the primary actors, acting in their own self-interest to ensure survival in an environment of anarchy. | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Realist | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 2 | 8 |
| Attribution, Achievable | Attribution is readily achievable; government-controlled complex capabilities make cost of entry is high; and signaling occurs before action. | 0 | 0 |
| Fixed Boundaries | Well-defined, fixed boundaries and territorial sovereignty exists. | 1 | 1 |
| Operational Restraint | The core strategic objective is to avoid operational contact through operational restraint. Security rests in the mind of the opponent (it is a psychological-political phenomenon), achieved through inaction on the part of one’s adversaries. | 0 | 0 |
| Rational, Maximize | States are rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility. | 1 | 1 |
| Security, Credible Threat | Security achieved through a credible threat of force (use of known capabilities) or cost imposition. (Causal mechanism: prospective threat of incontestable costs) | 1 | 2 |
| World as it is | Rooted in descriptive theories based on pessimistic view of human nature and the world as it is (Carr 1939, 12) | 1 | 4 |
| Deterrence |  | 2 | 79 |
| Anarchy |  | 1 | 1 |
| Balance of Power |  | 0 | 0 |
| Boundaries |  | 2 | 3 |
| Capabilities |  | 2 | 15 |
| Coercion | Coercion / coercive | 0 | 0 |
| Compel | Compel / Compellence | 0 | 0 |
| Consequences |  | 1 | 2 |
| Cost Benefit | Cost-benefit calculus | 0 | 0 |
| Costs | Impose costs / cost imposition | 0 | 0 |
| Counterforce |  | 0 | 0 |
| Countervalue |  | 0 | 0 |
| Credible | Credible / credibility | 1 | 1 |
| Cyberwar |  | 0 | 0 |
| Deny | Denial / deny benefits | 0 | 0 |
| Deter | Deter / Deterrence / Deterrent / Deterring | 2 | 18 |
| Dissuade |  | 0 | 0 |
| Hard Power |  | 1 | 3 |
| Offense | Offense-defense balance | 0 | 0 |
| Penalty | Penalty / penalize | 0 | 0 |
| Persuade | Persuade / persuasion | 0 | 0 |
| Power |  | 1 | 1 |
| Prevent | Prevent / prevention | 2 | 12 |
| Punishment |  | 0 | 0 |
| Rational | Rational / rationality | 0 | 0 |
| Restraint |  | 1 | 1 |
| Retaliation |  | 2 | 6 |
| Self Interests |  | 0 | 0 |
| Self-Help |  | 0 | 0 |
| Signal | Signal / signaling | 1 | 2 |
| Threat |  | 2 | 6 |
| Use of Force |  | 2 | 8 |